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 In  Nature and Culture in the Iliad: The Tragedy of Hector , James Redfield shows 
how the  Iliad ’s tragic qualities are bound up with cultural contradictions. He thus 
illuminates many murky areas of Aristotle’s  Poetics by the light of Homer and 
develops a philosophical anthropology of the Homeric heroes. 
 In this essay I return to the way the  Poetics and the  Iliad cast light on one 
another, with special attention to Aristotle’s insistence on “one complete action” 
and his account of the genesis of drama. I argue that, for Aristotle, the light shed by 
drama on action goes beyond what is conveyed by its plot. Aristotle sees in Homer 
a dramatic thought-action that culminates in moments where the performer appears 
to reach into the sources of his ongoing performance and to be enlivened by them. 
These “enlivening” moments are related to Aristotle’s “one complete action,” a 
certain kind of plot. Aspects of performance are harder to describe than plot, but 
they can, to a limited extent, be imitated, even in prose: and this is what Aristotle 
has done. Aristotle does not only admire Homer’s “one action” on the level of 
plot. For Aristotle, Homer discloses or taps the roots of action in a way that shows 
he understands what action is. Aristotle’s imitation of the dramatic thought-action 
found in Homer, and particularly in Homeric ring composition, conveys in prose 
a moment of culmination associated with performance, a kind of “possession” or 
reaching back to past generations that enlivens the ongoing performance. 
 First, then, I show how an appreciation of Homeric ring composition is reflected 
in Aristotle’s  Poetics , in his account of the birth of tragedy; here I summarise and 
make explicit what is left implicit in another study ( Kretler 2018 ). I then indicate 
parallels to Aristotle’s account elsewhere in Greek poetry. These make plausible 
the schema I bring out in Aristotle but also further clarify its shape and inter-
nal workings. Aristotle draws on a general poetic pattern but is fueled mainly by 
Homeric technique. 
 I offer these reflections in gratitude to James Redfield, whose teaching and 
writing stimulate so many to return to the well of ancient Greek poetic thinking. 
 One whole complete action: the shape of the  Iliad and a 
pivotal speech 
 Aristotle insists that tragedy is a mimesis of  praxis (action) that is one, whole 
and complete, having a beginning, middle and end ( Poetics 1459a19; cf. 
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1450b24–26). This is, to say the least, a stumbling block for critics. One salient 
problem is that, after all, “one complete action” is the last thing one might expect 
from tragedy. Tragedy is a rounded whole not because the action, like a well-
aimed arrow, hits its intended target, but because it diverges from its course in 
unexpected ways ( hamartia ,  peripeteia ). 
 Redfield solves the “one action” problem, with respect to the  Iliad , by bring-
ing into play the full social world depicted in the poem. A complete heroic action 
entails  hamartia not so much because of derailed intention but because of con-
tradictions inherent in culture. But completeness in action may be different from 
completeness of form: 
 An action is resolved when the needs and demands of the actors are either 
met or crushed out. Such an outcome is for the actors and concludes the 
action on the ethical level. Form, on the other hand, is for us; an action is 
formed when it reveals a lucid meaning to the contemplative eye of the poet 
and his audience. 
 ( Redfield 1994 , 219) 
 Redfield’s example of “formal” completeness is a case of ring composition. The 
most striking formal aspect of the  Iliad is the way the end echoes its beginning: 
 In the beginning a father is refused the ransoming of his child; at the end a 
ransoming is permitted. In the beginning Achilles quarrels with a king; at the 
end he is reconciled with a king. Since the persons are different, however, 
these echoes are purely formal. 
 ( Redfield 1994 , 219) 
 The  Iliad is a ring composition, that is, ABCXC′B ′A ′, where A′ echoes A, etc.; 
but in the  Iliad ’s end is not quite its beginning. 
 Form and action are, however, tightly connected within this ring composition – 
just not at its endpoints. They are linked in the  Iliad , moreover, in a way Aristotle 
appreciates. 
 The beginning and end of the  Iliad echo one another in two ways. The famous 
chart that folds out of the back of Cedric Whitman’s book ( Whitman 1958 ) traces 
a fully thematic ring composition. But there is another ring composition based on 
narrative chronology: the days at the poem’s end pass in clusters that mirror the 
temporal structure of the beginning (see Diagram 5.1 1 ). 
 Theme plays a role within this “calendrical” scheme as well: the central day 
is preceded and followed by a sequence of single days that mirror one another in 
theme and action. 
 It is at the calendrical centre of the poem that the pivotal Embassy to Achilles 
takes place (Book 9). This event unfolds in Achilles’s tent, which will in Book 24 
transmogrify into something like the House of Hades; Priam and Achilles enter 
a “divine sphere” where “culture is overcome” ( Redfield 1994 , 218). In Book 9 
too we are presented with a kind of liminal space: the Achaeans pray and make a 
solemn procession to Achilles’s tent to supplicate him, and here “the poem clearly 
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opens out into some previously unexplored territory” (ibid., 7). That is how Red-
field describes the great speech of Achilles, which suddenly discloses that clear 
vision of the contradictions of culture that links Achilles with the poet himself. 
“The hero . . . is a man on the margin between culture and nature. Achilles has, 
as it were, been pushed over the edge; he looks back at culture from the outside” 
(ibid., 103). In his own elaborate speech that immediately follows Achilles’s, 
Phoenix, the second of three envoys, has his own way of stepping outside, and 
reporting back from the margin. Not, like Achilles, out of a “unique self-reflective 
consciousness” (ibid., 36), but by playing or becoming the other: through drama 
and mimesis. 
 As Redfield writes, it is Phoenix who: 
 without wishing to . . . gives the true pattern of heroic rage; the hero cannot 
choose to be reconciled, he can only come back under compulsion, overpow-
ered by the irresistible claims of those closest to him . . . Achilles’ story, in fact, 
is not a departure from the heroic pattern but an enactment of that pattern. 
 ( Redfield 1994 , 105) 
 This pattern of heroic rage is the “return course” of the poem’s plot, and it emerges 
out of a dramatic unfolding. There is an opening out of perspective that emerges 
via actorly process, as the performer embodies Phoenix, who in turn is possessed 
by his own characters. 
 The speech of Phoenix is the central of three speeches of the Embassy, which 
stands at the centre of Book 9 (see Diagram 5.2 2 ). Book 9 in turn forms the centre 
of the “calendrical” schema of the poem mentioned earlier; the speech is itself one 
of the most elaborate ring-compositional speeches in the poem. 
 Like other ring-composed speeches, this one reaches an enlivening turning 
point that violently shifts the point of view of the speaker mid-course ( Lohmann 
1970 , 22). Such a turning point may be a personal reminiscence, a vividly imag-
ined object, a mythological exemplum from a previous generation of heroes, or 
Diagram 5.1 Calendar of the Iliad.
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the quotation of direct speech (ibid., 25). In this as in other ring compositions, 
“between the indication of the goal and its achievement, the world has changed.” 3 
 The enlivening midpoint is seen most clearly – and even thematized – in Nestor’s 
speech advising his son how to win, and enacting in advance, the chariot race in 
the funeral games for Patroklos ( Iliad 23.306–348). 4 In the first half, the speech is 
abstracted in time and place, and pessimistic; when Nestor reaches the centre, and 
vividly describes the turning point at which the competitors are aiming, he moves 
into the concrete, and suddenly becomes wildly hopeful about his son’s chances. Viv-
idly “seeing” and describing the far-off turning post (where none other than Phoenix 
keeps watch), 5 animates Nestor, even though he is only going around it in speech. 
 Here the enlivening turn is instantiated in the very object that forms the turning 
post. For, as  Nagy (1990 , 215) notes, “the narrative itself ostentatiously raises the 
possibility that this turning point is a sê ma, ‘tomb’ ” ( Iliad 23.331–33). Nagy con-
nects this with the conventional identification, in chariot races at the pan-Hellenic 
Games, of the turning point with the tomb of a hero. 6 He also draws a connection 
to the fact that at least one hero, Taraxippos, “upsetter of horses,” was thought to 
Diagram 5.2 Phoenix’s speech within Iliad Book 9.
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be active from his tomb. Drawing on the inherited semantics of  néomai, “return” 
or “return to light and life,” 7 Nagy connects the turning point in Nestor’s chariot 
race speech with the image of a return from death in Pindar: 
 ἀφνεὸς πενιχρός τε θανάτου παρὰ |  σᾶμα νέονται 
 Pindar  Nemean 7.19–20 
 Both rich and poor  rеturn [vеrb néomai] by going past the  sêma of Death. 
 The language is that of chariot racing, it seems, with the verb  néomai ‘return’ 
connoting the “home stretch” after rounding the turning point. Here, too, as 
with Nestor’s  sêma , the turning point is not just a ‘sign’: it is a “sign of 
Death” – or, to use the Homeric application, a ‘tomb.’ 
 ( Nagy 1990 , 219) 
 Two points: first, the chariot race, with Nestor’s speech, models the animation 
that can occur in Homeric ring composition and connects it to the image of return 
from death at a turning post or tomb; I return to the link between racecourse and 
performance later. Second, Nestor’s speech is linked to Phoenix himself, since 
Phoenix stands as a judge ( skopos ) at the very point where, in describing it, Nestor 
becomes animated. This link seems to reflect the structure of the poem (cf.  Kretler 
2018 , Interlude 1). 
 As the turning point for speeches, far more common than a vividly described 
object is a vividly recalled event or direct speech in the past. Thus 
 a “chronological gradient” develops between the rings and the centre; i.e. 
concentrically structured speeches or parts of speeches very often develop 
from the present to the past and back again to the present. 
 ( Lohmann 1970 , 26, trans. 1997, 86). 
 This chronological gradient is found in Phoenix’s speech, where the middle sec-
tion of the third panel suddenly develops unexpected layers of complexity ( Loh-
mann 1970 , 255). The “intensification” (ibid., 25) occurs at the central point of the 
story, where Phoenix accesses a generation of heroes still earlier than Meleager. 8 
At the start, Phoenix presents Meleager as a model for Achilles to follow; by 
the end, Meleager is a model to avoid. Briefly, Meleager has killed his mother’s 
brother(s); this leads to a battle between two cities and induces his mother to curse 
him. Like Achilles, Meleager withdraws from battle and is visited by a series of 
suppliants. Meleager is persuaded to return to battle, but only when his city is 
already in flames, and his own wife Kleopatra supplicates him, delivering a quasi-
lament, cataloguing the atrocities befalling a captured city. 
 Such a lament is not the speech act one would launch into while trying to per-
suade someone to  sack a city. And indeed Phoenix’s speech inspires Achilles not 
to return, but instead to remain out of battle until fire reaches the Achaean ships, 
just as fire reaches Meleager’s city. (Even then, he sends Patroklos rather than 
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return himself.) The speech misses its original mark, but Achilles has been pos-
sessed by this “true pattern of heroic rage.” 9 
 And Phoenix himself seems to have gone off the rails via a similar process 
of possession. An outline of the Meleager story’s ring-composition (abbreviated 
from  Gaisser 1969 , 18–19; cf.  Lohmann 1970 , 254–5) shows that it is not Melea-
ger, the ostensible paradigm, at the centre of the ring: 
 Instead of maintaining his focus on Meleager, Phoenix, snakes-and-ladders 
style, 10 slips one layer further, past Meleager to Meleager’s wife Kleopatra, and 
then to Kleopatra’s mother Marpessa. Who? One might ask. Marpessa’s story is 
alluded to in such abbreviated fashion that it must have been familiar. Of immediate 
relevance, Marpessa was raped by Apollo and rescued by her husband; this story 
seems strangely to go underground, and to foment Kleopatra’s lament, cataloguing 
disasters that include rape. But Marpessa’s pivotal role in the speech is overdeter-
mined; her story resonates not only within the Meleager portion of Phoenix’s speech 
but also with Phoenix’s autobiography, with which he begins. Both Marpessa and 
Phoenix are held in a curious “house arrest” by a furious father, and each is alert to 
the peril of abandonment in old age. It is as though Phoenix is drawn to her story 
because it resonates with his own, and thus “misses his aim” of presenting Melea-
ger as a model. Through recounting the story of Marpessa at the midpoint, Phoenix 
veers off target, and he speaks as – he becomes – Marpessa’s daughter Kleopatra, 
delivering a raw supplication on behalf of the victims of a city-sacking. 
 As I argue elsewhere ( Kretler 2018 , chapter 2), part of the actorly process that 
shunts the performer as Phoenix into the troubled past of Marpessa, and into 
I.    The War of the Kouretes and the Aetolians 524–549
II.  Meleager Retires from the Battle. 550–574
A The Battle Rages. 550–552
B Meleager’s Wrath 553–555 χόλος
C He Retires with Kleopatra. 556 κε ĩτο
X KLEOPATRA’S MOTHER MARPESSA. 557–564
C′ He Retires with Kleopatra. 565 παρκατέλεκτο
B′ Meleager’s Wrath 565–572 χόλον
A′ The Battle Rages. 573–574
III. Meleager is Persuaded. 574–599. (Catalogue of suppliants, ending
      with Kleopatra.)
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speaking as Kleopatra, involves the multivalent use of curse gestures. Phoenix, 
ostensibly supplicating Achilles, tells a story in which several characters are curs-
ing and supplicating. The curses summon underworld forces; but this is also just 
what Phoenix has, in effect, done in tapping Marpessa – in the process, turning 
his supplication of Achilles into a curse, and the  Iliad into a tragedy. In being 
possessed by the vanquished and delivering a lament, Phoenix finds another way 
to the thought that “if the vanquished is no different from the victor, combat is 
meaningless” ( Redfield 1994 , 221). 
 Aristotle Homerikôtatos: becoming the character 
and making dramatic mimeseis 
 As Phoenix is “possessed” by Kleopatra, so too is the performing poet possessed 
by Phoenix – to the extent, as it is made to seem, of diverting the poem onto a 
tragic course. So Phoenix appears to introduce new actorly modes and orders, as it 
were: actorly “possession” induces a revolution outside the bounds of the speech, 
in the very plotline of the poem in which Phoenix is playing a role. And this 
is what Aristotle (following Plato) found most impressive and disturbing about 
Homer – his “becoming something else” ( Poetics 1448a21–22). It is in speeches 
like Phoenix’s that the best clues are found about what was so disturbing about 
this “becoming.” 
 Insofar as the performer works his way into Phoenix, and Phoenix works his 
way into the person of Kleopatra via gesture, this is just how Aristotle would have 
the composer compose: in performance. 
 It is necessary to construct plots and to work them out with diction as much as 
possible setting them before the eyes. In this way, seeing things most vividly, 
just as if becoming present at them – the things as they are being done – one 
would discover what is appropriate and least miss contradictions . . . As far 
as possible, [one should compose] working it out with gestures too: for those 
who are in the emotions are most convincing – out of the same nature, and he 
distresses who is in distress and he is in a rage who is provoked most truly. 
So poetry is of a genius (εὐφυοῦς, of a good nature) or a madman (μανικοῦ): 
of these the former are easily shaped (εὔπλαστοι) and the latter get out of 
themselves altogether (ἐκστατικοί). 11 
 ( Poetics 1455a21–34) 12 
 Plot is the soul of tragedy; but Aristotle’s ideal plotter is a performer, in a cir-
cular process. As one becomes virtuous by doing virtuous deeds, one composes 
speeches by stepping into a character’s shoes and putting one’s hands into his 
gestures, so thoroughly that one is acting “out of the same nature” (ἀπὸ τῆς αὐτῆς 
φύσεως). Perhaps it is the power of plasticity (εὔπλαστοι; here, moulding oneself 
by incarnating another); perhaps it is ἔκστασις, getting outside oneself: Aristotle 
leaves it open. Composition in performance is Aristotle’s ideal. Does this entail 
that Aristotle thinks performance itself is essential? Given his explicit statements 
to the contrary, and his denigration of  opsis , the visual element, there is plenty 
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of reason for doubt. But the passage on composition through gesture opens the 
way to seeing the connection between Aristotelian composition in performance 
and Homeric ring composition, and to explaining his extravagant championing of 
Homer as a dramatist, as in his account of the evolution of tragedy: 
 For just as Homer was preeminently the poet with respect to serious matters 
(not that he alone composed well, but that he alone made dramatic mimeseis ), 
so too he first demonstrated the  schema(ta) (shapes) of comedy, making dra-
matic not invective but the laughable. For, just as the  Iliad and the  Odyssey 
are analogous to tragedies, so too the  Margites is analogous to comedies. 
And when tragedy and comedy had appeared, people rushed after each type 
of poetry according to their own nature: some became makers of comedy 
instead of lampoons, others became producers of tragedies instead of epics, 
on account of these shapes being greater and more honorable than those. 
 ( Poetics 1448b34–1449a6) 
 Homer “made dramatic  mimeseis ” or “made  mimeseis dramatic.” Homer is at 
first linked with serious matters ( spoudaia ), as we would expect; but suddenly 
we hear that Homer “demonstrated the  schemata of comedy.” These  schemata , as 
in the previously cited passage, seem to be not mere abstract “forms” but rather 
“gestures,” because of the verb  hypedeixen “demonstrated” and because of the 
emphasis on dramatising and bringing things into appearance (παραφανείσης, an 
unusual word used later of epiphanic situations). 
 In the evolutionary process Homer plays a central but complex role. He is the 
culmination of the natural activities that brought forth  poiêsis little by little out 
of improvisations (1448b20–34); and he is the font of both tragedy and comedy 
(1448b34–1449a2). He is an endpoint and a starting point, τέλος and ἀρχή. 
 This passage as a whole poses problems. First Aristotle describes two streams 
of development: for the serious poets, hymns/encomia – epic – Homeric epic – 
Attic tragedy; for the “cheap” crowd, invective – iambus –  Margites – comedy. 
When Aristotle then “adds separate suggestions about the emergence of tragedy 
and comedy from further forms of improvisation” (Halliwell 1987, 81), Halliwell 
finds that he makes “no effort . . .to relate these suggestions . . .to the larger 
evolutionary picture, within which Homeric works are deemed to have been the 
crucial factor underlying the emergence of both tragedy and comedy” (ibid.) 13 
So Aristotle has patched two accounts together; 14 or there is some other schema 
at work. A clue is provided in Halliwell’s phrase “the pivotal significance of the 
Homeric poems” (ibid.). 
 I suggest that, rather than confusing two accounts, Aristotle is reinforcing his 
overall picture of Homer’s dramatic mimesis by enacting it in ring composition 
(1448b18–49a13): see Diagram 5.3. 
 So Aristotle has composed his account of the birth of tragedy as a ring composi-
tion. Why? And why put Homer at the center? Homer stands as the turning point 
for more than one reason. First, his placement there is an emblem of what he does 
with plot. This is true not only because he composed the  Iliad as a ring. Within 
the story Aristotle is telling here, Homer transforms the plots of previous poetry. 
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As Halliwell points out, those noble men whose actions had been celebrated in 
encomia find themselves, in Homeric and Attic tragedy, involved in great changes 
of fortune, or transformations, which arouse pity and fear ( Halliwell 1987 , 81). 
The  peripeteia (reversal) that Homer effects is, I suggest, part of the reason for his 
pivotal place in Aristotle’s ring. 
 But the emphasis in the passage falls not on plot but rather on bringing things 
into appearance, and, as I have suggested, on gesture and enactment. Aristotle 
places Homer at the centre of a ring that begins and ends with primitive song 
and dance, as though he steps out into the middle of that dance as an exarchon 
himself. Homer stands at the centre of Aristotle’s ring composition, enlivening 
 Diagram 5.3 Aristotle’s ring: the birth of tragedy and comedy .
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all that come after him by means of embodiment – showing the way through ges-
tures. He makes the potential form actual not simply by directing potential poets 
to peripeteia or mimesis, but by pointing the way toward the source of action. 
Aristotle’s Homer, like Marpessa for Phoenix, and like the turning point, where 
Phoenix stands, for Nestor, is an ancestral source to be tapped by poets on their 
way to being re-born as tragedians, and indeed comedians. Out of the ultimate 
matrix, nature, through the undifferentiated  communitas of song and dance, and 
the spontaneous stirrings of improvisation, develops a form, epic, whose past yet 
living embodiment, Homer, remains to be tapped, reanimated and embodied by 
artists in the future. 
 Homer, unlike the proto-poets before him  and the tragedians and comedians 
who follow him, seems not to have his “own nature” or his “own character.” In 
fact, by being sandwiched between these two groups of people, he muddles the 
bifurcation of nature that Aristotle is setting up. 15 Only later do we find out why: 
because poetry is “of the well-natured or of the madman, for the former are shap-
able while the latter are  ekstatikoi ” (1455a32–33). Poetry is “of” a person whose 
nature can be moulded or who can get outside his nature, precisely by inhabiting 
someone else through gestures as they compose, such that they are proceeding 
“from the same nature,” in their emotions. 
 Likewise Homer confounds the evolutionary account of metre and genre. At 
first Aristotle claims that iambic metre came along in early blame poetry, fittingly, 
and iambic is so-called because people lampooned (ἰάμβιζον) each other in this 
metre (1449a31). Poets were divided into those of heroic (dactylic hexameter) 
and those of iambic metre (1448b32). But later Aristotle says that tragedy, from 
laughable and satyric beginnings, became dignified, and only then  changed from 
[trochaic] tetrameter to iambs (1449a21). This is where Aristotle remarks that 
iambs are most suited to speech, and so when tragedy moved from being more 
danced to more spoken, “nature itself found the proper meter” (1449a24). But 
have we already forgotten that iambs are suited for lampoons? Why does tragedy, 
when it becomes dignified, switch to the less dignified metre? And why does trag-
edy suddenly have its origins in the laughable? Wasn’t its origin in serious poets 
depicting serious people? 
 So Homer is a promiscuous funnel through which improvisers divided by char-
acter flow and eventually become poets divided by nature, no thanks to Homer! 
Homer’s mixed nature problematizes the “natural” development of poetry, 
because Homeric poetry inhabits the nature of others and takes possession of oth-
ers in turn. 
 Strictly speaking, a parallel between Aristotle and Phoenix or Nestor as per-
formers of ring composition would manifest itself in a change in perspective in 
Aristotle himself rather than in the confounding quality in Aristotle’s “Homer” 
that we have just been speaking of. But that is in fact what we see. For Aristotle 
himself gives the appearance of losing track of categories that he has set up, thus 
baffling his critics. As he approaches the Homeric midpoint – a “long interrup-
tion of the mainline of his genealogical argument” (Depew 2009, 129) – Aristotle 
veers from his position that Homer and Sophocles are alike in imitating  spoudaioi , 
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the serious people (1448a26), unexpectedly bringing in the  Margites and a rela-
tionship to proto-comedy, only to reiterate his usual view associating Homer in 
particular with  spoudaia (1448b34), in the same sentence where he tells us that 
Homer demonstrated the shapes/gestures of comedy. There is no acknowledge-
ment that here the very categories of nature and character, and even metre, are 
breaking down. In other words, approaching the midpoint, Aristotle seems to lose 
track of the idea that people do things “according to their own nature,” somewhat 
as Phoenix loses track of his own rhetorical goals, and as Nestor turns on a dime 
from pessimism to optimism. 
 I have suggested that Aristotle composed his account as a ring composition, 
and that in doing so Aristotle imitates Homeric ring composition, especially that 
in speeches, to convey a link between composition and performance at an enliv-
ening central point. I now cast the net a little wider to indicate briefly how Aris-
totle’s ring resonates with a broader cluster of patterns in Greek poetic thought. 
Recognising the features Aristotle’s ring shares with other figures of wholeness 
and regeneration in the same “species,” as it were, points toward how the parts of 
his ring function as a whole. It may also provide hints as to the genetic heritage 
of Aristotle’s ring. 
 The shield of Achilles and Aristotle’s ring 
 First, within the Homeric poems, there is a family resemblance to the Shield of 
Achilles, “a kind of master simile” ( Redfield 1994 , 187) and an image of  poiê-
sis . The most extended example of ecphrasis in the poem, the Shield’s performa-
tive virtues are less to the fore. Yet the Shield too, like the dramatically mimetic 
speeches, responds to comparison with Aristotle’s ring. 
 Redfield divides the Shield’s description into five circles whose themes form a 
ring composition: A) nature; B) the human world in itself; C) agricultural cycle/
human beings with nature; B) human society as pure communitas; A) nature 
( Redfield 1994 , 187–8). 
 When we put Aristotle’s ring side by side with the Shield, what stands out are 
correspondences at the beginnings and endings. Aristotle begins and ends with 
nature, with the  archê (beginning/ruling principle) of what is common to all, and 
the  telos (culmination) of fully-flourishing mimesis. The Shield likewise begins 
with nature, albeit nature “in the absence of man, as a realm of order and signifi-
cance” ( Redfield 1994 , 187): the rotating celestial bodies, but also Ocean, who 
is made as the genesis for all (ὅς περ γένεσις πάντεσσι τέτυκται); 16 it ends with 
Ocean alone, into which everything (except the Bear) must eventually plunge. 
Ocean is then a temporal and a spatial limit, but also a source and an endpoint, 
roughly corresponding to Aristotle’s nature as  archê and then  telos . Although 
Aristotle’s natural matrix is a human one, it is one of rhythm and  harmonia : what 
human nature shares with the circling heavens. As the Shield’s stars as a group 
look forward to their earthly projection in the separate seasons, with their own 
harmonies (Redfield’s circle three), so too Aristotle’s rhythm and harmony are 
the natural substrate for the divergent tunes and rhythms unfolding in their turn. 
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 Song and dance feature in the Shield’s second, third and fourth circles (out of 
Redfield’s five). In the second, there is wedding song and whirling dancers. In 
the third appears the linos-song, again with dancers. But the fourth circle does 
not merely contain song; it is entirely given over to a dance of young men and 
maidens. 
 Next to his own outermost sections, Aristotle has placed primitive song and 
dance (B/B'). To the Shield’s fourth ring, the round dance, society “as pure  com-
munitas ” ( Redfield 1994 , 187, citing  Turner 1969 ), corresponds the dithyramb 
and phallic processions ( phallika ) – primitive enactments: note the Shield’s com-
parison of the dance floor to the one made by Daidalos at Knossos once upon 
a time. Aristotle picks out the leaders ( exarchontes , 1449a11) of these dances/
processions, just as the Shield zooms in on the tumblers (and perhaps the bard), 
the  exarchontes of the dance (18.606). Note also that the Shield follows up a 
round dance with a dance “in lines” (18.602), where Aristotle mentions first the 
dithyramb and then the processional  phallika . 
 The simile used to describe the dancing in the Shield's fourth ring, of a seated 
potter trying (πειρήσεται) his wheel to see if it will run (18.601), seems more to 
describe Hephaestus, the “famous cripple” who is “elaborating” the dance, than 
it does the dancers, though he is working with metal rather than clay (see  Stanley 
1993 , 12). Thus this ring seems to mirror the creation of the shield, which in turn 
mirrors the creation of the poem. This impression is heightened if we accept the 
verse about the bard leading the dance. Somewhat as the character (or lack thereof) 
of Aristotle's Homer has no bearing on his  poiêsis , so too the Shield's smith, “lame 
in both legs,” produces elaborate dance moves. The macrocosm emerges bit by 
bit out of the microcosm with each improvisatory turn of the potter’s wheel (cf. 
αὐτοσχεδιασμάτων/αὐτοσχεδιαστική, at C and C' in Aristotle's ring). 
 Lonsdale points out that the “final vignette” on the Shield is a courtship dance 
(cf.  alphesiboiai , line 593), and that it not only echoes the first vignette, the bridal 
procession with acrobatic dances: rather, “This courtship dance is in a sense pre-
paratory to the wedding procession” ( Lonsdale 1995 , 276–7). Is there a similar 
pointing backward or closing of the ring in Aristotle? True, Aristotle does end with 
dances/processions associated with fertility, the  phallika ; those do not point back 
toward a wedding, but perhaps they point back toward the generative rhythm and 
harmonia σύμφυτον in human beings, and toward the birth imagery as a whole. 
The  phallika that would “incorporate lampooning” (Depew 2009, 129) look back 
too to the invectives ( psogoi ) as the dithyramb looks back to, as a species of, the 
hymns ( hymnoi ) (1448b27). 
 This backtracking prompts a double-take at the leaders or initiators ( exarchon-
tes ) shared by the Shield and Aristotle. If Aristotle’s final section of dancers points 
back to the beginning as the Shield's fourth ring does, the  exarchontes found there 
recall Aristotle’s phrase  ex archês (1448b22), planted, in fact, in the counterpart 
position of the ring (B/B'). Aristotle's  exarchontes have incorporated the  archê ; 
their bodies lead the circles and processions of others – perhaps as they summon 
the presence of Dionysus. Though chronologically we have returned to the primi-
tive stages, here the proto-poets are takers of action, unmoved movers of their 
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circles and lines. In this – not to mention in their lofty appendages – they are even 
more vital than those who “rush after” poetry once tragedy and comedy have 
made their epiphany (1449a2–3). The comedians ( kômôidopoioi ) and tragedians 
( tragôidodidaskaloi ), doers and teachers as they may be, 17 would seem more ani-
mated than the dithyramb and  phallika dancers, if the standard is dramatisation. 
But in terms of the ring with an animating centre, crossing the finish line at speed, 
fully loaded with presence, strikes the right note. (Here we may recall Nestor's 
breathless finish describing the return course, discussed above.) 
 The features shared by Aristotle’s birth of tragedy and the Shield are not only 
clustered near their endpoints but even serve to structure the whole. No sooner 
has Aristotle’s ring begun with communal nature than human character divides 
and reproduces itself. Likewise, on the Shield, not only are the two cities divided, 
but within the first, there are two men contesting, and in the second, two armies 
surrounding the city, divided two ways: bifurcations multiply seemingly gratu-
itously. Aristotle’s repeated dichotomies in the characters of primitive poets and 
their genres are roughly parallel in their seeming excess, a feature discussed in the 
following section. 
 What about the middle? Here the Shield correspondence may not be as fruitful. 
(The Shield’s physical structure as concentric rings potentially confuses the mat-
ter: what we are discussing here is the ring-compositional structure of its descrip-
tion, whose centre is not at the physical centre of the Shield.) In the centre of 
Aristotle’s ring stands a figure who collapses these distinctions and gives birth, 
through enactment, to the various transformations. On Redfield’s schema for the 
Shield, the ring-compositional centre belongs to the agricultural/seasonal circle. 
Redfield does not locate a precise centre, though it would seem to lie between 
the second and third season (since Redfield sees the seasons as four). Stanley’s 
schema ( Stanley 1993 , 10), using three seasons, puts the scepter-bearing king at 
the centre, taking pleasure in the harvest. On the Shield, the bard or the potter, or 
Hephaestus himself – or even the Bear or the object of her gaze, Orion (18.487–
89) – might make iconic equivalents for Homer’s central orchestrating position 
that are more appealing than the king. 
 To recall our initial focus, however, on the turning point as  regenerative , just 
this is seen in miniature in the refreshing cup of wine a man hands the ploughmen 
as they reach the turning point of each row of the field. 18 It is too bad, I thought, 
that this refreshing cup is not offered at the turning point of the ring, for example 
where (to take Stanley’s schema) the king is standing. Still, the phrase στρέψαντες 
ἱκοίατο τέλσον (turning, they would reach the endpoint, 18.544) does appear at 
the mathematical (in terms of lines) centre of the Shield – that is, if one includes 
the line about the bard. 
 As we would recognise the bard on the Shield, or Hephaestus himself, as an 
image of the poet performing it, so we may “take pleasure in gazing on images 
especially accurately made” (1448b11) “because as we gaze we learn and we put 
together what each thing is, like that this is that” (1448b16). So too we by nature 
delight in rhythms and can take pleasure in recognising the “sections” of Aristo-
tle’s rhythmic composition. 
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 With so bald a portrait as the bard in the Shield, the pleasure of recognition 
would not be as great. “When we have learnt what already familiar thing a picture 
represents we have not learnt much” ( Lucas 1968 , 72). But from the Shield as a 
whole, as Redfield has shown, we learn much about the wellsprings of the  Iliad ; 
and from Aristotle’s image we learn about Aristotle’s perception of Homer and 
mimesis. If we do not at first recognise the pattern, all the better. “For Aristotle a 
dramatic text moves and engrosses us when we recognize in it some comprehen-
sible pattern of causes – and . . . it moves us most when this pattern comes to us 
unexpectedly and thus extends our understanding” ( Redfield 1994 , 67, quoting 
 Poetics 1452a1–4). 
 If modern readers have trouble recognising it, Aristotle’s ring falls within a 
more general pattern of Greek poetry and thought, a pattern recognisable to his 
readers – and to his live audience of students, assisted by whatever visual aids 
Aristotle used in lecture. The Shield helps bring the workings of Aristotle’s ring 
into focus, but both Aristotle’s ring and the Shield should be seen against the 
background of such broader patterns. This can only be gestured at here. 
 The frieze of dancers on the Shield of Achilles is, it is true, “a motif not unknown 
to Geometric pottery” ( Whitman 1958 , 205), and in fact just these dancers form 
the tenor of the simile of the potter trying his wheel. But the more general pattern, 
the movement to and from a reanimating/transforming centre, seems even more 
at home within choral poetry itself, with its turns and returns. 
 The previously mentioned “chronological gradient” seen in Homeric speeches, 
complete with animating central episode, is indeed at home in choral poetry, and 
appears for example throughout the Pindaric corpus. Though Pindar’s use of ring 
composition is more complex, there is still a central exploit in the past at which 
the dancers are aiming, and once they arrive, they “somatiz[e]” the hero’s quali-
ties ( Mullen 1982 , 65) in a way that stops short of shedding their own identities. 
Pindar’s odes illustrate the relation of one connected action to a past moment 
of heroic action or suffering that resonates through the ancestors down to the 
victor at the focus of the celebration. This contact with a primal scene is rooted 
in choreographed movement rather than histrionic presencing. Pindar choreo-
graphs moments of beginning and completion, and Pindar himself uses the terms 
 archê and  telos in a way suggestive, to Mullen, of Aristotle. One way Pindar 
choreographs these patterns is through the triadic structure of strophe-antistrophe-
epode. However the dancers stepped this out, the turn and counterturn do not 
come together to form a ring composition, in the sense that, despite its name, the 
antistrophe metrically reproduces, rather than reverses, the strophe. Nevertheless 
a strophe can narrate an approach to a central point, as we shall see. “However 
it may have been used by others, for this poet the triadic form was there to make 
manifest both the beginnings and the ends of mortal action, and thus somehow 
to implicate in the dance the Olympians who further them” ( Mullen 1982 , 117). 
 In the following section I flesh out Mullen’s suggestion about the kinship 
between Aristotelian beginnings and endings and choral poetry, using not Pindar 
but Euripides. On the register of myth and image, Pindar’s  Nemean 7, cited above, 
presents the schema of a return from death at the turning point of a chariot race, a 
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race such as that dramatised in Nestor’s speech. The racecourse schema appears 
in another choral example, the second stasimon of Euripides’s  Heracles . Although 
this is an example from tragedy, it shows how features found in Aristotle’s ring 
might be rooted in choral movements. The racecourse of death is here found in a 
constellation of features that make this Euripidean ode, too, a fruitful comparan-
dum for Aristotle’s ring. 
 Reanimation and the separation of noble and base in a 
Euripidean ode 
 In Euripides’s  Heracles , the titular hero returns from Hades just in time to save 
his wife and children from the evil tyrant Lycus. But once Lycus is safely dead, 
Heracles is driven mad and turns on his family and kills them. The helpless chorus 
of old men sings the second stasimon just as Heracles has arrived, and it osten-
sibly celebrates him as a saviour. But the ironies in the ode are heavy – at least 
on a second viewing – given that Heracles is going to kill Lycus; but for his own 
second act he will kill his own children. 
 This ode (lines 637–700) is the prime example in Richard Martin’s stimulating 
discussion ( Martin 2007 ), which I draw on here, of choral poetry’s rich imagery 
of proper limits and of passing beyond that limit; the chorus is often singing of its 
own limits in a way that may reflect their ongoing dance. 
 The context of the ode is that Heracles has just returned from Hades. The ode 
consists of two strophic pairs, a structure that mirrors the content of the ode in 
a complex fashion. In the first strophe the old men, somewhat Nestor-like, sing 
of their lost youth and the burden of old age. By the end of the first strophe they 
have dismissed old age, bidding it be gone into the sky “on wing.” In the antis-
trophe they turn to a reanimation fantasy, singing that if the gods were intelligent 
they would arrange things such that the good would come back for a second life 
after death, while the bad would not. They put this in terms of the racecourse 
schema: coming back for a double youth would be a clear mark,  charakter , of 
virtue. A second life doesn’t make a very good marker. 19 There is also ambiguity 
as to whether one life constitutes one “double course,” such that the good would 
have a whole new “double course,” or whether, as in Pindar, coming back from 
death is the “home stretch.” The chorus, as they complete the antistrophe, admit 
that in reality life goes “whirling” on in the sheer accumulation of money and 
there is no distinguishing sign of virtue. But in the second strophe, they them-
selves are high-stepping it into their own second youth, touting the virtues of 
song and dance and saying “I shall not stop” mixing Muses and Graces, and cel-
ebrating memory and victorious Heracles, with Dionysus giver of wine. Finally, 
the second antistrophe culminates in their encomium for Heracles, whom they 
now declare definitively to be the “son of Zeus” and a surpassing benefactor. The 
chorus members equate themselves with the Delian maidens singing for Apollo. 
They seem to have found the standard of all judgements in a man who resists 
categories by surpassing them, and who is also, by the enthusiastic end, a source 
of a “life unbeaten by waves” (698–699; cf. line 664, whereby the ill-born would 
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have only a single  bioton ). Meanwhile, of course, Heracles is about to kill his 
own wife and children. 
 So the  Heracles ode links reanimation at the turning point with the theme of 
separating the noble from the base, and with the actual confusion of these catego-
ries at the turning point. Meanwhile the old men seem to have found the fountain 
of youth in memory and in singing their god-man, oblivious to the fact that Her-
acles himself is, as Carson puts it ( Carson 2006 , 13), a two-part man, a man with 
a very different “return course” in this play. The chorus is newly animated by, or 
at least after, singing of the double youth, seeming to enlist themselves among 
the good, and wildly overshoot the mark in their encomium of their hero, the 
memory of whose deeds is fuelling their steps that will “never stop” – evincing 
the truth that old men turning young are no more a sign of anything than a second 
life would be. The ode’s two strophic pairs make for a more complex structure 
than simple ring composition. But their strophic movements are correlated to their 
double-life fantasy and their wild encomium in such a way that the choreography 
brings out the confusion of categories at the turning point. This undermines the 
old men’s fantasy, but manifests in detail, I am saying, the underlying schema, 
where confusion of the central point  is part of the point , not merely ironic. 
 The  Heracles ode wishes for a “clear sign” upon mortals distinguishing noble 
from bad; the sign itself, though,  is their coming back around for a second youth. 
This theme of a clear sign at the turning point is seen too in the chariot race of 
 Iliad 23 – not the  sêma itself, but a sign on the contestants, as in the  Heracles ode. 
Idomeneus and Ajax are competing to judge the winner coming around the bend, 
while Phoenix was stationed at the midpoint to verify just that himself. The narra-
tor (23.454–455) singles out such a clear sign in the  sêma on the leading horse’s 
head as he comes around the bend, though the characters fall into dispute. Here 
too we have a disputed sign, and the theme of old age and youth is in play in this 
passage. 
 Like the old men in Euripides’s chorus, Aristotle sets out to mark clear divi-
sions between noble and base. While the praise and blame poetry that Aristotle 
mentions itself enacts judgement, Aristotle too winnows the poets’ characters 
at each stage of evolution within his teleological schema. (Note too Aristotle’s 
elaborate withholding of judgement [ episkopein ;  krinai ], about whether tragedy 
“already holds sufficiently in its kinds or not” [ Poetics 1449a7–9].) 
 These distinctions are overstretched, in Aristotle’s scheme, well before they 
reach the breaking point in Aristotle’s figure of Homer. For only the base to blame 
the base, and the noble to praise the noble, is indeed “overly restrictive” ( Nagy 
1979 , 254). Perhaps, as Nagy suggests, Aristotle is retrojecting his definitions 
of comedy and tragedy as base and noble media onto the blame and praise poets 
( Nagy 1979 , 254–255): praise poets are noble because tragedians are noble. But 
shaping the discussion this way also allows Aristotle to enact a movement from 
speech acts that are not able to get outside their own categories – presumably the 
base blamers do not realise that they are just doing so because they are base – to a 
higher platform of judgement, or a stepping outside of or collapsing these catego-
ries, that comes with the full dramatisation of “Homer.” This movement includes 
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an impetus toward higher developments of schemata because they are “more hon-
orable” (1449a6), but the ultimate is the midpoint, the transcending of categories 
in Aristotle’s Homer. 
 So the Euripidean ode makes plausible that Aristotle is drawing upon a tradi-
tional scheme when he combines the themes of a) multiple divisions into noble 
and base; b) a doubt that such a division is possible; c) a central figure praised for 
transcending those categories in a problematic fashion; d) the theme of anima-
tion at a central turning point. However the ode played out in detail, its strophic 
choreography rendered visible somehow the pattern of a double course bound 
up with judgement and animation. Such a visible pattern and others like it would 
likely have been part of the mental equipment of Aristotle and his students and 
readers. But whatever the ode may tell us about the sources for Aristotle’s birth of 
tragedy, even more vital is what it can tell us about how the elements in Aristotle’s 
ring are functioning together. If the motif of judgement is already problematized 
in the  Heracles ode, it is plausible that Aristotle too is using these motifs in a 
non-straightforward fashion. Aristotle re-enacts rather than discourses upon the 
sources of drama in  mimesis . 
 In this passage where Aristotle seems to be echoing a schema of arrival at an 
enlivening turning point, the matrices of drama are the kinds of processions and 
dances where some of the details of such a schema might be most at home. I 
would not assert that Aristotle “borrowed” the details of his ring from a particular 
genre or source. He may have. But ancient  mousikê absorbs ideas and realities 
from society, crystallises them in its own way and releases them out again into 
the world. In fact  mousikê was probably the primary mode in which this hap-
pened. And even if, as some claim, Aristotle stood at the end of this choral culture, 
he did not stand outside it, but was swept up in its figures too. Although within 
Aristotle’s ring Homer forms the culmination, this is a further development of an 
animation, or embodiment, seen  in nuce already in the dance and in processions. 
 Aristotle’s circular thought-action 
 Having argued that Aristotle constructed his birth of tragedy as a ring centred 
around Homer, thus instantiating both a dramatic transformation and a unity com-
ing into view, and having sketched some parallels in choral lyric, I now want to 
circle back to Aristotle’s idea of action. I mentioned earlier that Aristotle was 
attracted to Homeric performance because it made visible something about Aris-
totle’s own thinking about action. Ring composition is not foreign to Aristotle. 20 
And Aristotle’s thought is fully compatible with what Mary  Douglas (2007 ) calls 
“thinking in circles.” In action, for Aristotle, thinking casts its way back and back 
until it reaches the end ( eschaton ), the font from which action can proceed. 
 In the  Metaphysics , for example, Aristotle maps out the wellsprings of action 
taken by a physician (here  poiêsis rather than  praxis ) as follows: 
 And the healthy comes about from [the physician] thinking in this way: since 
this-here ( todi ) is health, it is necessary that, if there will be health, this-here 
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( todi ) must obtain, for instance homogeneity, and if this, heat: and so he 
keeps on thinking, until he brings (the thought process) to that which he him-
self has the power, at the end, to do. Then the movement away from this point 
is called  poiêsis ,  poiêsis toward becoming healthy. So it follows in a certain 
way that health comes about from health, and a house from a house;  out of 
that without matter, that which has matter . 21 
 Thought proceeds from the here-and-now backward to what is farthest away, 
there finding a way forward again into action ( poiêsis ). Aristotle’s striking formu-
lation, “out of that without matter, that which has matter,” has thought tapping the 
source of matter itself. This is a picture of  poiêsis rather than  praxis , so it cannot 
be pressed too hard for the meaning of “one complete  praxis .” Nevertheless, the 
passage does resonate with Homeric  poiêsis , both in the enlivening midpoint of 
ring-composed speeches, and in the gradual casting backward to find the way 
forward. 
 Phoenix delivers a speech at the calendrical centre, in a ring composition 
deeply embedded within Book 9, where the enlivening in performance bears fruit 
in the discovery of the “home stretch” of the poem’s plot, the true tragic pattern 
that will inspire its inner audience, who will carry the poem to its telos. That is, 
of course, how things seem to the outer audience, us. We cannot know by what 
back and forth process this speech developed. From another point of view, just 
where the performer/composer has seeded for himself the kernel for the rest of 
his plot’s development, and left himself a thread of Ariadne, the performer-as-
Phoenix hurtles outside his cultural milieu toward the seedbed of Kleopatra and 
her mother Marpessa, only to find there the pattern of heroic rage. Through the 
speech of Phoenix the performer too finds himself in a space of transformation, 
and through him, so does the audience. It is a  katharsis , both in the sense of a 
purification enacted imaginatively by the detached, formative understanding of 
the artist ( Redfield 1994 , 161), and of a sudden coming upon the source of action. 
The performer comes upon this source in the form of a pattern, and in another 
sense of  houtos ekeinos , “this is that”: the coming to presence that turns thought 
into action.  Houtos ekeinos, the that is now the this, he (or rather she) is now I 
(thinks the poet/performer), she is now you/he (thinks the audience), “aha!” To 
borrow Ford’s formulation on tragic  katharsis : 
 A great deal of artistry was required on the poet’s part, and no little criti-
cal attentiveness on the part of the audience. But the experience as a whole 
issued in something that was more like undergoing a mystic initiation than 
coolly appraising or observing a show. 
 ( Ford 2016 , 38) 
 The Homeric performer transforms and is transformed to a higher degree than 
early performers of dithyramb, who, according to the author of the Aristotelian 
Problem 19, “kept a grip on their character.” 22 This is why Homer, not the dithy-
ramb, occupies the central point in Aristotle’s ring-compositional scheme. 
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 The kind of unity enacted here is a  peripeteia, a turnaround or reversal, brought 
on by accessing a consciousness that belongs to a past generation, or is deeply 
ensconced in the character’s memory, or is marginal to the group. And this kind 
of unity resembles a “whole action” in a different sense – in the sense that one 
is getting at the origins of an action, tapping into its source. An action seen as 
aiming at a goal that has just come into view. It has come into view because of a 
transformation that occurs in the course of speaking and being transformed, in the 
course of performance. 
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tions about Homer, Aristotle, and performance. 
  1 Adapted from Whitman (1958, 257). 
  2 From Whitman (1958, 281). 
  3  Bakker (1997 , 120–1), citing  Gaisser (1969 , 4) and  Thalmann (1984 , 22). 
  4  Lohmann (1970 , 17), trans. in  Wright and Jones (1997 , 77). 
  5 On the connection between Phoenix and Nestor, and between Phoenix’s role as judge 
here and his Book 9 speech, see  Kretler (2018 , Interlude 1). 
  6  Nagy (1990 , 215), citing  Sinos (1980 , 53n6). Cf.  Mullen (1982 , 60). 
  7 Cf.  Frame (1978 ). 
  8 For the comparable move in Pindar, see  Mullen (1982 , 65). 
  9 Cf. the place of the “root paradigm” in Victor Turner's social drama: Thomas Becket is 
possessed, for example, by “the action paradigm provided by the Via Crucis in Chris-
tian belief and ritual” within his own social drama. See  Turner (1974 , ch. 2);  Turner 
(1982 , 73). 
 10 Cf. Plato’s magnetic rings,  Ion 533d. 
 11 They are “liable to be ‘possessed’ from time to time” ( Else 1967 , 48). 
 12 All translations from Aristotle are my own. 
 13 Cf.  Lucas (1968 , 78 on 1449a6). 
 14 As in  Janko’s (1987 , 76) diagram: 
 lampoon > Margites > comedy < phallic songs 
 hymn > epic > tragedy < dithyramb and satyric poem 
 15 Else deflects the usual interpretation of κατὰ τὰ οἰκεῖα ἤθη as referring to the character 
of primordial poets, since otherwise “Homer would be an insoluble paradox, not to say 
a monster. Was he both σεμνότερος and εὐτελέστερος?” ( Else 1957 , 136). 
 16 As he is called at 14.246, as noted by  Edwards (1991 , 231) on  Iliad 18.607–608. 
 17 “There seems no reason for this elegant variation” of terms ( Lucas 1968 , 78 on 1449a4). 
But they serve almost as epithets to let these people stand forth as they are coming to be 
poets. 
 18 See  Edwards (1991 , 222 on 18.543 and 544–547). Edwards observes, “The sudden 
insight into the labourers’ minds (547) is noteworthy.” It occurs in a scene “which 
includes movement and the desires of the depicted figures; the audience is thereby 
encouraged not to imagine the surface appearance of an image (the visual medium) 
but to imagine the world depicted therein . . . Lines 548–49 then call us back to the 
(visual and verbal) context of the scene” ( Becker 1990 , 143, quoted by  Edwards 1991 , 
Tapping the wellsprings of action 89
222). The penetration of one level of narration into another just at its centre, and the 
inhabiting of the minds found there, is reminiscent of ring-composed speeches such as 
Phoenix’s. 
 19 As  Bond (1981 , 233) notes. If, that is, the second life  is the marker of goodness, how 
do we know who around us is back for their second go-around? And even if they are 
recognisably on their second round, what good does this do us in their first round? 
 20 On Aristotle’s use of ring composition see  Barney (2010 , 36–7, 41). 
 21  Metaphysics Z 1032b6–14. 
 22 On this passage see  Mullen (1982 , 53). 
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